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Introduction
This brief presents a critical discussion of the political economy of agricultural 
commercialisation in Zimbabwe, focusing on the post-2000 period – when
major land redistribution brought about dramatic agrarian structural 
transformation in the country. Understanding shifts in production and
commodity marketing, and how these have had an impact on commercialisation
patterns, helps to reveal how power, state practice, and capital all influence 
accumulation for the different groups of farmers in divergent settlement 
models.
Zimbabwe’s agricultural sector currently provides employment for over 70 
percent of the country’s rural population. A decline in formal employment 
opportunities has given rise to changing employment patterns, with many 
agricultural workers are now involved in a mixture of family labour supply, 
labour hiring-in and hiring-out at various stages of the season – a pattern which 
has become particularly prevalent in the expanding tobacco sector.
Debate about agricultural development in Zimbabwe has frequently centred 
around its perceived viability as a means of capital accumulation – expressed 
through standardised constructions of ‘good’, ‘modern’ and ‘progressive’ 
farming. The discourse about viability traditionally characterised smallholder 
farming within southern African colonial states as primitive and in need of 
improvement. Subsequent development efforts, particularly from international 
donors like the World Bank, then sought to create a new, entrepreneurial farmer 
able to replicate the ‘ideal’ features of the large-scale commercial farmer in 
Zimbabwe. But for most Zimbabweans, a lack of land and access to capital and 
other resources made this ‘ideal’ unattainable; and so the country retained the 
dualist system of large-scale commercial agriculture and small-scale subsistence 
agriculture – with minimal linkages between them until the Fast Track Land 
Reform Programme (FTLRP) in 2000.
The brief will explore the political economy of commercialisation in Zimbabwe 
following the land reform of 2000, asking which actor-network interests are 
aligned with which models of commercialisation, and how this is playing out 
within state policy, and in practice.
Key messages
 ● A new agrarian structure, and better access 
to agricultural financing, are shaping 
commercialisation patterns in Zimbabwe.
 ● New, non-bank financing options are driving 
the production of food and cash crops in all 
farming sectors of Zimbabwe. These options 
include government-mediated command 
agriculture, independent contract farming and 
joint ventures. 
 ● Government support to the agricultural sector 
has changed over time, primarily as a result of 
shifting ideologies, and changing state capacity 
to finance the agricultural sector.
 ● Both farmers and the government agree on the 
need for agricultural commercialisation, though 
often for different reasons. With links to global 
markets, cash crops are the main drivers of 
commercialisation. 
 ● Political patronage plays a significant role in 
determining agricultural policy, rendering 
ordinary farmers disillusioned with the political 
system, and resigned to merely ‘jump through 
hoops’ to make a living.
 ● Political struggles over the control of the state 
and its limited resources revolve around land and 
agriculture as they have always in Zimbabwe, but 
now with greater confusion and uncertainty.
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Changing agrarian structure
Zimbabwe’s FTLRP in 2000 resulted in a dramatic agrarian 
reconfiguration, bringing about a wider diversity of farm sizes: 
large-scale commercial farms (LSCFs), small-scale commercial 
farms (SSCFs), old resettlement areas (ORAs), communal areas 
(CAs) and newly resettled areas (A1 and A2). This provided new 
settings in the ongoing debate around viability, and what forms of 
commercialisation were possible. 
Around 10 million ha of formerly white-owned, large-scale farm 
units were allocated to small- and medium-scale farmers; while 
nearly 150,000 families were resettled in A1 plots, receiving an 
average of 6 ha, generally in better agro-ecological settings. The 
FTLRP also placed 22,000 families in A2 commercial farms with 
plots averaging around 140 ha. A2 farms were primarily given to 
government officials, ruling party elites and well-connected business 
people – those deemed to have the financial muscle to operate on 
a commercial basis, and with business plans notionally drawn up in 
advance, allowing them to affirm ‘viability’ on paper at least.
Having moved away from the post-independence, dualistic agrarian 
structure – with racially divided large- and small-scale farms co-
existing – Zimbabwe now exhibits a ‘trimodal’ agrarian structure. 
This is split into a predominant cohort of smallholders, estimated to 
occupy 82 percent of the country’s agricultural land; medium-scale 
farms taking up 13 percent; and large-scale farms.
Production patterns
As a result of the change in agrarian structure, new dynamics 
have emerged across the different settlement models in response 
to diverging resource allocation and agro-ecological settings. 
These dynamics have had significant but variegated impacts for 
agricultural commercialisation in rural Zimbabwe. 
Since 2000, small-scale A1 farms have engaged primarily in 
the commercial production of tobacco under contract farming 
arrangements, and have ventured into small-scale livestock, 
horticulture and other commercial activities. Medium-scale A2 farms, 
however, have experienced major restrictions on private credit and 
loan finance, and diminishing government capacity to support 
production – meaning that many such farms are unproductive in the 
absence of private finance.
An initial overall decline in agricultural production, which resulted 
from the FTLRP’s implementation, has begun to reverse – maize 
production, for example, rose to an all-time high of over 2 million 
t in 2017. This trend suggests a post-2000 shift in agricultural 
commercialisation across settlement sectors, tied to command 
agriculture, independent contract farming and the emergence of 
joint ventures (see box).
Command agriculture, contract   
farming and joint ventures
Command agriculture
While cultivation of the majority of crops in Zimbabwe 
remains self-financed, a number of crops have been targeted 
for contract farming. 70 percent of Zimbabwe’s tobacco 
production is currently financed through contract farming – 
predominantly via foreign sources. However, many of these 
international investors are engaged in command agriculture: 
a government-mediated contract farming arrangement, 
in which farmers are directed to produce certain types 
of commodities, but are supported by international and 
domestic finance with agricultural inputs and access to 
markets. Command agriculture beneficiaries are mainly A2 
farms, and are generally bureaucratic, military and senior 
ZANU-PF personnel. By targeting this group, the Mnangagwa 
faction within ZANU-PF sought to create a middle class 
capable of mobilising grassroots support for their political 
cause.
In order to secure the compliance of farmers, contractors 
often co-opt ZANU-PF local leadership in farming 
committees, and local security agents are enlisted to enforce 
contractual agreements and to collect farmers’ assets in 
the event of default. Independent farming has created a 
middle class of farmers who are divorced from politics, 
or are able to take leadership positions in politics. Unlike 
independent contract farming, command agriculture – being 
state-mediated – provides opportunities for patronage, 
highlighted by the fact that the Ministry of Agriculture 
coordinates the selection of beneficiaries, the distribution of 
inputs and the collection of farming outputs.
Joint ventures
Persistent and mounting pressure on Zimbabwe’s 
government to improve agricultural productivity and 
to improve food security has led to a policy shift that 
encourages joint ventures. Joint venture arrangements 
in Zimbabwe generally involve former white commercial 
farmers – and some Chinese and Russian investors – on one 
hand, and resettled A2 (medium-scale farmers) on the other. 
The former invest in technology and operational financing, 
while the latter provides the land – with both sharing profits 
at the end of the agricultural season. Joint ventures usually 
operate for a period of five years. 
Many of these joint ventures are engaged in export markets, 
producing tobacco, peas and citrus for China, the Middle East 
and the UK. By securing external finance, these joint ventures 
have played a leading role in bringing new technology to 
Zimbabwe’s agricultural sector. They have also helped to 
instigate the cultivation of improved crop varieties, which 
have boosted productivity among  medium-scale farmers.© Toendepi Shonhe
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Subsidies and government support
Post-2000 policy shifts
Since 2000, a number of public finance and subsidised programmes 
have been introduced, including the crop input credit schemes 
run by the Grain Marketing Board, the Irrigation Rehabilitation 
and Development Programme, and the Public Sector Investment 
Programme. These government and Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 
(RBZ)-run programmes had the key objective of improving 
agricultural productivity to support industrial revival and 
development in the face of an economic crisis. 
Initially, most subsidy programmes were targeted at the A2 sector, 
which were considered to have greater potential for commercialised 
agriculture. Three predominant aims can be detected in the subsidy 
programmes: one focused on welfare and food security, with seed 
and fertiliser distributed to poorer smallholder households; another 
focused on boosting the potential for commercial production; and 
a third which advanced electoral goals for the ruling party, through 
patronage politics and campaigns. 
In the period from 2009–13, changes in government personnel – 
notably in the Ministry of Finance – resulted in changes in policy 
priorities and interests. There was a consequent decline in direct, 
visible patronage support to elite landowners in the A2 areas, 
and support instead focused on food security and smallholder 
farming. The party’s social democratic orientation meant that more 
support was channelled towards smallholder farmers in CA and A1 
settlement schemes. In particular, government support for maize 
production increased in the 2013/14 farming season, as efforts went 
towards food security, rather than commercialisation. 
Renewed focus on commercialisation
Following the termination of the Government of National Unity 
and the establishment of ZANU-PF dominance following the 2013 
general elections, there has been renewed support for commercial 
agriculture from elite interests. In the 2016/17 season, for example, 
the government introduced a Special Maize Production programme 
under a command agriculture strategy, where around 90,000 
farmers were contracted and funded with US$160 million to produce 
maize. This programme gave priority to farmers using irrigation, and 
in areas of high productivity.
Agricultural policymaking remains contested as various 
stakeholders, including government ministries and departments, 
have competing interests. The RBZ and the Ministry of Finance 
seek to earn foreign currency through the production of export 
and cash crops through commercialised agriculture. The Ministry 
of Agriculture, meanwhile, seeks to achieve food security, and the 
Ministry of Lands aims for greater land utilisation in the country’s 
productive regions. Of these actors, the Ministry of Finance has 
been at the forefront of advancing agricultural policy changes in 
post-2000 Zimbabwe – which have generally focused on improving 
foreign currency earnings, and Treasury revenues. Agricultural 
commercialisation has therefore been driven by the coinciding of 
policy interests between farmers, international capital and senior 
ZANU-PF politicians.
Case study: Mvurwi farming area
Mvurwi offers a microcosm of the wider farming picture in 
Zimbabwe: large-scale estate production sits alongside medium-
scale farming, which is struggling to establish itself despite 
significant support through government subsidy programmes. 
Small-scale farming – communal and A1 – dominates in Mvurwi in 
terms of total area farmed and the number of people involved. This 
settlement model has been supported by government programmes, 
generally associated with election years, and with limited scope for 
commercialisation. 
Some commercialisation of tobacco farming and horticulture has 
emerged in the A1 areas, aided by greater land utilisation, and some 
irrigation. For the most part, these have occurred independently 
of government support and subsidy regimes, which have been 
intermittent, inconsistent and politically targeted. Most farmers in 
these areas have self-financed the development of their farming 
operations, and access links to markets and capital via a number of 
contracting companies.
Joint ventures and associated public-private partnerships 
tend to benefit ruling party elites, who have entered into 
such arrangements. Moreover, the medium-scale farming 
sector mainly consist of ZANU-PF elites, bureaucrats and 
military personnel who were allocated farms with better 
farming infrastructure. Under a convoluted state-party 
system, as is the case with the ZANU-PF government, 
resources secured through such an opaque process can 
easily find their way into the party system, which has 
allowed ZANU-PF to rely on handouts – usually in the form 
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Farmers’ perspective
For many smallholders, Zimbabwe’s wider political economy is 
irrelevant, and subsidy and support regimes are more symbolic 
than having any tangible effect. This can be explained, in part, by 
diminishing state capacity in rural areas for delivery, management 
and control and, in part, because the reach of party politics – outside 
of election time – is fragmented and poorly coordinated, with only 
some local elites benefitting from state patronage.
The local political economy is more about making deals with traders, 
input suppliers, contractors and others, than the wider national 
political economy. A disillusioned rural majority therefore merely 
jump through the hoops of a shifting, disconnected and often 
corrupt political system, in order just to make a living.
Conclusion
Discourse around viability in the post-2000 period has been 
contradictory. Some state branches and the party-military elite 
support large- and medium-scale agriculture as the only route to 
reviving the economy, and as a potential source of accumulation for 
themselves. Others have advocated a smallholder route, recognising 
the electoral importance of the rural vote, as well as the A1 farming 
sector’s potential as a site of a growing number of petty commodity 
producers accumulating from below. Tensions between such 
discourses – and the associated actor networks – are reflected in the 
struggles over land and patronage-based allocation of resources.
Subsidy regimes have focused on both small- and medium-scale 
farmers, often with electoral calculations in mind. Meanwhile, 
opposition groups – while accepting the irreversibility of the 
FTLRP – have failed to articulate a rural policy, and a few have 
argued for the retention of a large-scale farming sector through 
external investment and joint ventures. Although largely in favour 
of agricultural commercialisation, the political opposition is seen 
as aligned to white capital, and therefore opposed to small-scale 
farming. As a result, resettled farmers and CA smallholders have
tended to vote for the ruling party in an effort to protect their plots, 
thereby ensuring ZANU-PF’s continued retention of power. 
Yet, as the Mvurwi case study suggests, there is a disconnect 
between the day-to-day practices of local people trying to negotiate 
livelihoods by producing and selling crops, and the wider political 
machinations of Zimbabwe’s fraught political economy. While 
patronage politics, subsidy regimes and selective state support 
palpably affect certain elites, most people must get on with life and 
engage in business in what is a highly uncertain, often risky context.
Today, commercial farming in Zimbabwe is at a crossroads, where 
political economy – perhaps more than factors of productivity, 
technology or labour – influences production and accumulation 
outcomes, with scope for farmer-led commercialisation. Political 
struggles over the control of the state and its limited resources 
revolve around land as they always have in Zimbabwe, but now 
with greater confusion and uncertainty. At present, agricultural 
commercialisation and rural politics are tied to the two forms of 
contract farming (independent and command agriculture), with far-
reaching implications for Zimbabwe’s disarticulated economy.
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